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I. INTRODUCTION
"ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
Office (GAO), ten percent of every health care dollar spent in
this nation is lost to fraudulent and wasteful provider claims.
Applying this estimate to all health care spending means that
more than $100 billion, or over $274 million a day, was lost to
fraud and abuse in fiscal year 1995."l Moreover, anecdotal
testimony suggests that official action recoups only a portion of
this loss because "[t]he relatively small amount of each false
bill, technical rules, and the paper trail needed to build a suc-
cessful case limit public prosecutions of health care abuses."2
To combat fraud in the health care market, there are three
major federal statutes in place designed to protect the purses of
Medicare and Medicaid:3 the Social Security Act's section
pertaining to fraud and abuse of federal health care programs4
(Fraud and Abuse statute), the 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties
Law,5 and the Stark legislation.6 In addition to the protections
1. COMMITEE ON GOV'T REFoRM AND OVERSIGHT, HEATH CARE FRAUD: ALL PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE PAYERS NEED FEDERAL CRIMINAL ANTI-FRAUD PROTECTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 104-
747, at 2 (1996).
2. David C. Hsia, Application of Qui Tam to the Quality of Health Care, 14 J. LEGAL
MED. 301, 315 (1993) (quoting GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/T-HRD-92-32,
CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT AND FUNDING NEED IMPROVEMENT (1992) and GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, (PUB. No. GAO/HRD-92-69), HEALTH INSURANCE: VULNERABLE PAYERS LOSE
BILLIONS TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (1992)).
3. It should be noted that the newly passed Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191 (1996), also has provisions pertaining to Medicare and
Medicaid fraud. These provisions are discussed herein where relevant.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(a) (West 1997).
5. The 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties Law "gives the Inspector General the authority to
seek restitution from anyone who submits a false claim to Medicare, Medicaid, or any other
federally financed health or welfare program. Under [this law] providers can be fined $2000 per
claim and be assessed as much as twice the amount of the claim." MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 8,
1991 (discussing the Civil Monetary Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-27a (1981)). This statute
can be used by itself or in conjunction with the FCA. Id.
6. Id. § 1395nn (West 1997). The Stark legislation consists of The Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act (Stark I) and The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993
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given specifically to Medicare and Medicaid, the federal trea-
sury is generally protected from contractor fraud by the False
Claims Act (FCA)
This Note addresses the narrow question of whether an
alleged violation of the anti-kickback portion of the Fraud and
Abuse statute, by itself, renders a Medicare claim8 "false" for
purposes of FCA. This has recently been addressed by two
federal district courts, each reaching a different result. In Unit-
ed States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp. Inc., the Mid-
dle District of Tennessee held that a claim alleging FCA liabil-
ity premised on a violation of the anti-kickback portion of the
Fraud and Abuse statute can survive a summary judgment
motion.9 On the other hand, the Southern District of Texas
held in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. that an anti-kickback violation does not create
a per se false claim under the FCA upon which such relief may
be granted.1°
(Stark LI). Stark I prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to clinical laboratories in
which the physician has an ownership interest. Stark H expands the prohibition against self-refer-
ral to additional health care services such as radiology services, prosthetics, home health services,
outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospital services. See Andrea Tuwiner
Vavonese, Comment, The Medicare Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act: Is Igno-
rance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U.L. REV.
943, 955 (1996); Joseph Avanzato & David A. Wollin, Health Care Fraud: Potential Pifallsfor
Health Care Providers, RI. BJ., Jan. 1996, at 9, 13-14 (outlining the basic tenets of the Stark
legislation).
7. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (West 1997).
8. This Note addresses liability surrounding claims for payment submitted to Medicare
and/or Medicaid. However, in the interest of clarity, this Note refers only to Medicare. While the
programs are undoubtedly different in many respects, it should be assumed that when liability for
a claim submitted to Medicare is discussed, the same liability would apply to a claim submitted to
Medicaid.
9. 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
10. 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the district
court's decision in part and vacated and remanded in part. See United States ex rel Thompson v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., No. 96-40868, 1997 WL 619314 (5th Cir., Oct. 23, 1997). The
effect of the Fifth Circuit decision is discussed where relevant.
An analogous question is whether FCA liability can be predicated upon a violation of
Stark I or Stark 11. While this Note does not specifically address the question of FCA liability for
violations of the Stark laws, it appears that the answer becomes clearer when dealing with
prohibited physician self-referrals. As Ralph W. Mello, the attorney who represented the plaintiff
in the Pogue case points out, "a claim submitted in violation of [Stark I or Stark II] is a false
claim" under the FCA since:
Both Stark I and Stark II, in addition to prohibiting the referral, expressly prohibit the
entity that receives the illegal referral from presenting, or causing to be presented a
claim to Medicare for the services furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral. 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(B) . . . . Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) expressly
19981
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The answer has tremendous consequences for health care
providers. While violations of the Fraud and Abuse statute can
only be prosecuted by the government, claims under the FCA
can be brought both by the government and by private individ-
uals under the FCA's "qui tam" provisions."
The qui tam provisions of the FCA enable private indi-
viduals to sue those perpetrating fraud against the govern-
ment. 2 These provisions encourage individuals to report fraud
by allowing those who do come forward to share in the
government's recovery after a defendant is successfully prose-
cuted or settles.'3 If a violation of the anti-kickback statute
creates a per se viable claim under the FCA, private individu-
als will essentially be able to enforce the anti-kickback statute.
Moreover, since those who bring suit are eligible to receive a
generous bounty proportionate to the award they bring, 4 such
enforcement will hardly be lacking.
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether a violation
of the anti-kickback statute should constitute a per se viable
claim under the FCA. While much has been written about the
anti-kickback statute and the qui tam provisions of the FCA
individually, it was not until the Pogue and Thompson deci-
sions that the interplay of these two statutes became a consid-
eration. This Note is unique because it is the first to focus on
this interplay and to address the question of whether a violation
of the anti-kickback statute should constitute a per se viable
claim under the FCA. Part II of this Note contains a brief
summary of each statute and the provisions at issue. Part III
provides that the government cannot pay any claim submitted for services that are
furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral.
Ralph W. Mello, FCA Liability for Stark I and Stark!I Violations Is Clear, HEALTH CARE FRAUD
LmG. REP., May 1996, at 3. The Fraud and Abuse statute does not contain similar language. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (West 1997).
11. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West 1997). See also Francis E. Purcell, Qui Tam Suits Under the
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression 42 CATH. U.
L. REV. 935, 938 (1993) (citing 3 WLiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 160 (11 ed. 1768)). "The term 'qui tam' is taken from the Latin phrase 'qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitor,' which translates to 'who sues on behalf of the
king as well as for himself.' Id. For a history of the qui tam action in the Anglo-American legal
system, see generally Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the
Government: Which is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1061, 1063-65 (1991).
12. See generally 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b) (West 1997).
13. See id. § 3730(d).
14. Seeid.
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analyzes the conflicting decisions in Pogue and Thompson. Part
IV examines the relevant policy considerations in choosing a
default rule. In Part V, this Note concludes that the default rule
should be that a violation of the anti-kickback statute does not
constitute a per se viable claim under the FCA.
H. SUMMARY OF THE STATUTES
A. The False Claims Act
1. Background and Current Provisions
The False Claims Act (FCA) prohibits individuals from
knowingly submitting a false claim to the government for
money. 5 The FCA was originally enacted in 1863 "in re-
sponse to cases of contractor fraud perpetrated on the Union
Army during the Civil War."'16 It allows the U.S. Attorney
General to bring civil suit against those who violate its provi-
sions.' Private individuals are also authorized to bring civil
suit against violators under the Act's qui tam provisions.'
In order to establish a violation of the FCA, the party
bringing the suit must prove that the defendant knowingly
presented, or caused to be presented, a false claim 9 to the
15. Id. §§ 3729-3733.
16. S. Rep. No. 345, 99" Cong., Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5270.
17. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(a) (West 1997).
18. Id. § 3730(b)(1). See also Michael Lawrence Kolis, Settling for Less: The Department
of Justice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN.
LJ. AM. U. 409, 414 n.20 (1993) (citing P. David Richardson, Private Law Enforcement: Qui
Tam Actions and Shareholder Suits, in LAWYERS' DEsK BOOK ON WHrrE-COLLAR CRIME 173,
174 (Milton Eisenberg ed., 1991)). When the False Claims Act was signed into law in 1863,
"Congress thought it necessary to enact the qui tam provisions... because, during a huge military
buildup at the height of the Civil War, [the Department of Justice] had just come into existence,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not exist, and the War Department did not have any
investigative arm. Therefore, the United States simply did not have the resources to control the
fraud and waste of the growing military industry." Id. Now, "[t]he legislative intent underlying the
qui tam mechanism is to provide incentives for 'whistleblowers' to assist the federal government
in the discovery and prosecution of fraudulent claims by offering them a 'bounty,' i.e., a per-
centage of any monies recovered from the defendant in an FCA suit." Thomas F. O'Neil, Ill et al.,
The Buck Stops Here: Preemption of Third-Party Claims by the False Claims Act, 12 J. CONTEM.
HEMA.TH L. & POL'Y 41, 44-45 (1995).
19. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(c) (West 1997) defines "claim" as: any request or demand, whether
under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property
which is requested or demanded, or if the government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or
other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.
1998]
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government for payment or made a false statement or represen-
tation in order to obtain payment from the government.' The
statute defines "knowingly" as "(1) ha[ving] actual knowledge
of the information,"21 (2) "act[ing] in deliberate ignorance of
the truth or falsity of the information;"' or (3) "act[ing] in
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the information."'
While that section also states that "no proof of specific intent
to defraud is required,"24 courts routinely have found innocent
mistake and mere negligence as valid defenses to FCA liabili-
ty.' However, "considerable disagreement centers on deter-
mining when one is acting with 'deliberate ignorance' or 'reck-
less disregard' rather than being 'merely negligent. '""
20. See id. § 3729(a). Specifically, that section states:
A) LABamrrY FOR CERTAIN ACTS. ANY PERSON WHO:
1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of
the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government;
3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid;
4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be
used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to
conceal the property, delivers or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount
for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government,
makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the
receipt is true;
6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government or a member of the Armed
Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, is liable to the United States Government ....
d.
21. Id. §3739(b)(2).
22. Id. § 3739(b)(2).
23. Id. § 3729(b)(3).
24. Id. § 3729(b).
25. See Pamela H. Bucy, Civil Prosecution of Health Care Fraud, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 693, 697 (1995) (citing Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9* Cir.
1992)).
26. Robert Salcido, Application of the False Claims Act "Knowledge" Standard: What One
Must "Know" to be Held Liable Under the Act, 8 HEALTH LAw, Winter 1996, at 1, 2. Salcido
states that the legislative history of the FCA and its amendments provide little definitive guidance
since they "[speak] in metaphors and generalities." Id. at 5. Sacido points to the following
examples: 132 Cong. Rec. 29322 (Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Rep. Berman), "While the Act was
not intended to apply to mere negligence, it is intended to apply to situations that could be
considered gross negligence where the submitted claims to the Government are prepared in such a
[Vol. 8:83
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Persons found guilty of violating the FCA face "a civil
penalty of not less than $5000 and not more than $10,000 [per
claim], plus three times the amount of damages which the
government sustains because of the act of that person."'27
Since courts have interpreted this language as creating a man-
datory formula to be applied after a violation of the act is
found, most defendants face strong incentives to settle false
claims actions brought against them.2 It should also be noted
that when a defendant actively cooperates with the
government's investigation, a more lenient method of calculat-
ing penalties is available.29
sloppy or unsupervised fashion that resulted in overcharges to the government. The Act is also
intended not to permit artful defense counsel to require some form of intent as an essential
ingredient of proof. This section is intended to reach the 'ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand'
problem where government contractors hide behind the fact they were not personally aware that
such overcharges may have occurred." Id. at 5. See also S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 5-6 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. "Those doing business with the Government have an
obligation to make a limited inquiry to ensure the claims they submit are accurate." Id.
27. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West 1997). "It is important to note that the damages are now
structured to make litigation worthwhile for the plaintiff. If the defendant has made only one or a
few claims, but they are of large amounts, the damages portion of the statute which requires the
defendant to pay three times the amount of the fraudulent claim has some bite. If the defendant
has regularly made a great number of claims for small dollar amounts, the civil penalty of not less
than $5,000 per claim makes it financially worthwhile for the plaintiff to bring a suit." Carolyn J.
Paschke, Note, The Qui Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The Statute in Current
Form, Its History and Its Unique Position to Influence the Health Care Industry, 9 J.L. & HEALTH
163, 169 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
28. See Harry R. Silver & Sanford V. Teplitzky, The False Claims Act: A Potent Weapon
in the War on Health Care Fraud, HEALTH CARE LMG. REP., Apr. 1996, at 5 (citing United
States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). For example, United States v. Lorenzo
involved an FCA violation charged by the government against a dentist. "The dentist had
performed routine dental examinations, which are not reimbursable by Medicare, and
characterized a portion of each examination as 'cancer examination of the oral cavity, head/neck'
in order to obtain Medicare reimbursement. The court determined that this was fraud and that
3,683 separate false claims had been submitted. Even though each of the false claims was for
$35.50, which amounted to total overcharges of $130,719.10, the court ruled that it was required
by the FCA to impose a civil penalty of $5,000 for each of the 3,683 separate false claims. This
amounted to $18.4 million in mandatory civil penalties." Id. The statute allows for such an
outcome:
[B]oth § 3729(a)(1) and § 3729(a)(2) may apply to a given situation. However, the
number of counts can vary, depending on which section is charged. Assume for
example, a sub-contractor submits fifty false claims to a contractor who, unaware of
the falsity, includes the invoices when submitting a claim to the government for
reimbursement. The sub-contractor could be charged under § 3729(a)(2) with fifty
counts for causing submission of fifty false statements to get a claim paid. Or, the
subcontractor could be charged under § 3729(a)(1) with one count for causing
submission of a false claim.
Bucy, supra note 25, at 701-02 (illustrating options for prosecutorial discretion). See supra note
20 for the exact wording of § 3729(a)(1) and § 3729(a)(2).
29. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(7)(A-C) (West 1997) states that if: (A) the person committing
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2. Qui Tam Actions
a. Standing and Procedure
The qui tam provisions of the FCA enable private individ-
uals to sue those perpetrating fraud against the govemment.'
They encourage and reward individuals for reporting fraudulent
behavior by allowing those who do come forward to share in
the government's recovery after a successful prosecution or
settlement.3 Individuals who come forward under the qui tam
provisions are called "relators" since they relate or inform the
government of the fraud in question. While the qui tam provi-
sions essentially allow anybody with knowledge of prohibited
behavior to have standing as a relator, the statute carves out
certain situations where private individuals are not allowed to
bring suits.
First, "[i]n no event may a person bring an action ...
which is based upon allegations or transactions which are the
subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty
proceeding in which the Government is already a party."32
Second, "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure33 of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Of-
fice report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
the violation turns himself in and provides to the government "all the information known to such
person about the violation within thirty days after [he] first obtained the information;" (B) the
relator "fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such violation;" and (C) "at the
time such person furnished the United States with the information about the violation, no criminal
prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with respect to
such violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation
into such violation" then "the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which
the Government sustains because of the act of the person."
30. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
31. See generally id. § 3730. (establishing civil actions for false claims).
32. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(3) (West 1997).
33. "The 'public disclosure' restriction has proven to be the greatest jurisdictional barrier
for qui tam relators." William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits As Monitoring Devices
in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1815 (1996). "The majority
interpretation of the public disclosure bar views qui tam actions as 'based upon' a public
disclosure whenever the factual basis for the relator's suit has been revealed in the public domain,
regardless of whether the relator in fact derived knowledge of the facts from that disclosure." Id.
at 1815 n.67 (citations omitted).
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media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an 'original source'34 of the
information."
35
Once a qui tam action has been filed, "no one other than
the government or the original relator can intervene or bring
any case based on the facts of the original action." 36 "In other
words, no copy cat suits are allowed, and the first case bars all
others based on the same facts."37 If a latter-filed case alleges
some facts that are contained in the original case and other
facts that are not, the overlapping factual allegations are strick-
en from the latter-filed complaint, while original allegations are
allowed to stand.3
The basic procedural rules for bringing a qui tam suit are
relatively straightforward. A private plaintiff files a complaint.
The complaint is kept under court seal for sixty days to allow
the government to investigate the claim without the defendant's
knowledge. 39 After the expiration of the sixty-day period, the
government must choose whether or not to join the action.' If
the government joins the action it has "the primary responsibil-
ity for prosecuting the action."4 While the original private
party plaintiff has the right to continue as a co-party to the ac-
tion, his rights can be severely limited by the court upon a
showing that the party's participation will interfere with or
delay the prosecution, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or
34. An "original source" is defined as one who has "direct and independent knowledge of
the information" and who voluntarily provides it to the government before filing the qui tam
action. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 1997). While courts are split on what constitutes
'direct and independent' knowledge, "[tihe majority of courts that have considered the original
source requirement [have found] that the relator must obtain 'direct knowledge' of the fraud
without the benefit of an intermediary who introduces the information to the relator. Similarly,
courts characterize a relator's knowledge as 'independent' when the information is not acquired
through public disclosure or, in some instances through the government." Francis E. Purcell,
Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear
Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U.L. REv. 935,963 (1993).
35. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 1997).
36. David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Firepower is Aimed at
Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127, 132 (1995). See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(5)
(West 1997).
37. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)).
38. See id. at 132 n.21 (citing several cases including Erickson ex rel. United States v.
American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908 (E.D Va. 1989).
39. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2) (West 1997).
40. See id
41. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
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harassing.42 Moreover, the government may settle or dismiss
the case over the objections of the relator. 3
If the government does not join the action, the relator has
the right to continue the suit on his own.' However, the gov-
ernment retains the reserved right to intervene and join the
action at a later date.45
b. Potential Awards
If after investigating the relator's claim the government
decides to take up the action, the relator is entitled to receive
"at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the pro-
ceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon
the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action."' But, where the information pro-
vided by the relator is not a "substantial contribution," "the
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in
no case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into
account the significance of the information and the role of the
person bringing the action in advancing the case to litiga-
tion."'47 Regardless of the amount of recovery the action yields
or whether the information provided is a "substantial contribu-
tion" under the statute, private plaintiffs "shall also receive an
amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have
been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs" from the losing parties.'
A relator is able to challenge the government in court if it
considers inadequate a settlement between the government and
a defendant.49 Towards this end, a relator may have the right
to conduct discovery in order to find out the elements of a
settlement where the relator has been excluded from such negotiations.5
42. See id. § 3730(c)(2).
43. See id.
44. See id. § 3730(c)(3).
45. See id.
46. Id. § 3730(d).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ryan, supra note 36, at 132 n.23 (noting that several relators have been successful in
such challenges).
50. Id. (citing United States ex rel. McCoy v. California Medical Review, Inc., 133 F.R.D.
143 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
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If the government does not take over the action and the
private party continues the suit on its own, it is entitled to a
greater share of the recovery if it prevails.
If the Government does not proceed with an action under this
section, the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall
receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for
collecting the civil penalty and damages. The amount shall be
not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out of
such proceeds. Such person shall also receive an amount for
reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been neces-
sarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All
such expenses fees and costs shall be awarded against the de-
fendant.5'
On the other hand, if the defendant prevails and the court finds
"that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly
frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for harass-
ment" then the court may award the defendant reasonable
attorneys fees and expenses. 2
3. The Rise of Qui Tam
While the FCA has been in force for over a century, it has
only recently begun to garner more attention from health care
providers. In the mid-1980s, in the midst of rising concern for
the federal budget deficit and increased discoveries of govern-
ment contracting fraud, particularly in the military, Congress
decided to re-vamp the FCA as its primary tool for fighting
fraud perpetrated against the government. 3 Recognizing that
courts had not been applying the Act as rigorously as was
originally intended,54 Congress made significant amendments
51. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(2) (West 1997).
52. Id. § 3730(d)(4).
53. See Kolis, supra note 18, at 414 n.44 (citing Kenneth D. Brody, Recent Developments
in the Area of 'Qui Tam' Lawsuits: A New Weapon For Challenging Those Who May Be
Submitting False Claims to the Government, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 592, 592 (1990)). See also
Silver & Teplitzky, supra note 28 (stating that news reports that defense contractors "were selling
$400 hammers and $800 toilet seats to the military" influenced Congress to amend the FCA in
1986).
54. See FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS Acr OF 1986, S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5270 (stating that "[s]ince the Act was last amended in
1943, several restrictive court interpretations of the act have emerged which tend to thwart the
effectiveness of the statute," but not citing specific precedent).
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to the FCA in 1986.5' The 1986 amendments increased the
penalties assessed against violators,' raised the percentage of
recovery available to plaintiffs,57 lowered the burden of proof
required to prove a claim," and allowed plaintiffs to continue
with the suit themselves if the government decided not to take
over the prosecution. 9 Also, "under the former statute, a rela-
tor had to prove actual knowledge. The more liberal post-1986
version... extends liability to virtually anybody involved with
the claim to make sure there has been no mistake or fraud."
As a result of the 1986 Amendments, there has been a
dramatic increase in the number of qui tam suits filed, with
large recoveries by both the government and plaintiffs.6
"From 1943 to 1986, there were only three qui tam cases re-
covering a total of $54,000... since the passage of the [1986]
amendments, there have been 1,386 qui tam filings with recov-
eries of over $1 billion. 62 Moreover, the predominant target
55. See FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS Acr OF 1986, S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89 ("The Committee's overall intent in amending the
qui tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more private enforcement suits.").
56. "The civil penalty was increased from double the amount of the damages sustained to
triple the amount. The [per claim] forfeiture amount was increased from $2000 to [$5000-
$10,000]." Frank LaSalle, Note, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden
of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 500 n.21 (1995) (citing 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988)).
57. Prior to the 1986 amendments, relators could only receive up to ten percent of the
award when the government intervened and took over the suit. See Purcell, supra note 11, at 945.
See generally 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d) (West 1997) (listing the recovery percentages currently
available to plaintiffs).
58. Prior to the 1986 Amendments, there was some ambiguity as to the requisite standard
of proof with "some courts [erroneously] employ[ing] a clear and convincing standard, an
essentially criminal standard, to the FCA, a basically civil statute." Kolis, supra note 18, at 424
n.72 (citing False Claims Reform Act: Hearings on S.1562 Before Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99' Cong., 35 (1985) (statement of
Jay B. Stephens, Deputy Associate Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice)). Now, the statute is
clean "The essential elements of the cause of action, including damages [must be proved] by a
preponderance of the evidence." 31 U.S.C.A. § 3731(c) (West 1997).
59. Under the 1986 Amendments, relators are now able to continue their claims if the
government decides not to pick it up. As will be discussed, this provision is one of the most hotly
contested changes to the FCA under the 1986 Amendments. See infra pp. 114-15.
60. Paschke, supra note 27, at 168.
61. "Despite its long history and several amendments, the [FCA] was little more than a
dusty lance in the government's armory until the past decade." O'Neil et al, supra note 18, at 43
(describing the large increase in the number of qui tam suits filed since the 1986 amendments to
the FCA). See also Park, supra note 11, at 1061-62 (citing Bruce Fein, Bounty Hunters
Unleashed, WASH. TiMES, Aug. 22, 1989, at Fl).
62. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., INc., Study Predicts Increase in Federal Health Fraud,
Private Recovery Actions, BNA MEDICARE REP., Nov. 15, 1996 (citing a September 1996 study
by The False Claims Legal Act Center in Washington, D.C.). See also Thomas F. O'Neil & Adam
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of qui tam suits has shifted from defense contractors to health
care providers and other federal program suppliers.63 In fact,
"[m]ore than 20% of the qui tam cases filed since the 1986
amendments have involved allegations of fraud against the
United States Department of Health and Human Services."'
It should also be noted that the changes to the qui tam
provisions instituted by the 1986 amendments are highly con-
troversial. Before their passage, the Department of Justice
strenuously opposed them6 5 Since their passage, their consti-
tutionality has been challenged on several grounds, but without
success
66
B. The Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Statute
The Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse statute im-
poses criminal penalties on those who defraud the Medicare
and Medicaid programs.67 The purpose of this statute is not
only to punish wrongdoers, but also to prevent the over-utiliza-
tion of services and to contain the costs of these programs. The
statute is divided into two major parts.
Part (a) prohibits essentially the same conduct as covered
by the False Claims Act.' Its most general provision punishes
H. Charnes, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primerfor Health Care Lawyers, 5 ANN.
HEALTH L. 33, 43 (1996) (stating that since the 1986 amendments, more than 1100 qui tam cases
have been filed, with a total recovery of over one billion dollars).
63. See BNA MEDICARE REP., supra note 62, at 45.
64. O'Neil et al., supra note 18, at 42.
65. See generally Kolis, supra note 16, at 426-33.
66. "Defendants challenging the constitutionality of the FCA's qui tam provisions have
focused on four issues: standing, separation of powers, appointments of executive officers, and
due process. Thus far, these challenges have been unsuccessful." Bucy, supra note 25, at 708
(describing cases challenging the constitutionality of qui tam on these grounds). Discussion of the
constitutionality of the qui tam provisions is beyond the scope of this Note. But for additional
discussion, see also Park, supra note 11, at 1073-80; Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of
Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 543 (1990); Evan Caminker,
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE LJ. 341 (1989).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b) (West 1997).
68. Specifically, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (West 1997) provides:
(a) MAKING OR CAUSING TO BE MADE FALSE STATEMENTS OR REPRESENTATIONS.
Whoever-
(1) knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or
representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment under a
Federal health care program
(2) at any time knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false state-
ment or representation for use in determining rights to such benefit or payment,
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anybody who "knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be
made a false statement or representation of any material fact in
any application for any benefit or payment under a federal
health care program."69 Examples of offenses under this part
include billing for services not actually provided or falsely
claiming that services provided were medically necessary in
order to obtain government reimbursement.'
Part (b) is the anti-kickback portion of the fraud and abuse
statute ("anti-kickback" statute)." This part:
(3) having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting (A) his initial or con-
tinued right to any such benefit or payment, or (B) the initial or continued right to any
such benefit or payment of any other individual in whose behalf he has applied for or
is receiving such benefit or payment, conceals or fails to disclose such event with an
intent fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a greater amount or
quantity than is due or when no such benefit or payment is authorized,
(4) having made application to receive such benefit or payment for the use and benefit
of another and having received it, knowingly and willfully converts such benefit or
payment or any part thereof to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other
person,
(5) presents or causes to be presented a claim for a physician's service for which
payment may be made under a federal health care program and knows that the
individual who furnished the service was not licensed as a physician, or
(6) knowingly and willfully disposes of assets (including by any transfer in trust) in
order for an individual to become eligible for medical assistance under a State plan
under subchapter XIX of this chapter, if disposing of the assets results in the
imposition of a period of ineligibility for such assistance under §1396p(c) of this title,
shall [be guilty of a violation].
Id.
69. Ia § 1320a-7(b)(a)(1).
70. See Sanford V. Teplitzky, Medicare Fraud and Abuse Issues, in HEALTH CARE M&A,
397, 400 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.741, 1996).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West 1997). The statute specifically provides in pertinent
part:
b) ILLEGAL REMUNERATIONS
1) whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind -
A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under a Federal health care program, or
B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person -
A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the fur-
nishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under a Federal health care program, or
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prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, offer, payment, or
receipt, directly or indirectly, of any remuneration (including
kickbacks, bribes or rebates), either in cash or in kind in return
for patient, product, or service referrals whenever payment from
either the Medicare or Medicaid program is involved. [The]
statute applies to any type of referral, including sales of prod-
ucts such as prescriptions, and applies both to the payer and the
recipient of the kickback.
The main purpose of the anti-kickback provision is to reduce
health care costs rather than punish "wrongdoers."'73 The un-
derlying rationale is that "[i]f providers are paid for referrals,
they have an incentive to overrefer, thereby increasing utiliza-
tion and costs. Adding insult to injury, including the referral in
the charge to Medicare or Medicaid would further increase
costs."'74
The fact that the anti-kickback provisions prohibit a broad
scope of conduct and provider arrangements has been discussed
extensively since the last major amendments to the Fraud and
Abuse statute in 1986.'5 Nonetheless, courts have continually
refused to narrow the scope of conduct that the statute prohib-
its. 6 The leading case, United States v. Greber, held that if
one purpose of a payment was to induce future reciprocal
B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing,
or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be guilty of a felony and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
Id.
72. Avanzato & Wollin, supra note 6, at 9.
73. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205,207 (1996) (explaining
the policy behind the anti-kickback portion of the fraud and abuse statute).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., John J. Farley, Note, The Medicare Antifraud Statute and Safe Harbor
Regulations: Suggestionsfor Change, 81 GEo. L.J. 167, 173 (1992) (stating that critics have
argued that financial arrangements beneficial to patient care have been prohibited by the statute);
Ellen L. Janos & M. Daria Niewenhous, White Coat Crime or Hospital-Physician Financial
Relationships in the 90's, BOSTON BJ., May-June 1996, at 8 (discussing the breadth of conduct
covered by the anti-kickback law).
76. See Avanzato & wollin, supra note 6, at 9-11 (describing how courts interpret anti-
kickback provisions).
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referrals, the payment violates the anti-kickback law.' "Under
Greber, the breadth of the prohibition of the fraud and abuse
law is truly startling. It calls into question numerous routine
practices in the health care industry as the industry consolidates
and otherwise seeks to rationalize and make more efficient the
delivery of services.""8 Furthermore, the breadth of prohibited
conduct could have the opposite effect of that intended by the
statute's drafters.
Greber makes illegal much restructuring in the health care
marketplace that is appropriate in the rationalizing of the health
care industry. In the current environment, it is a truism that the
fraud and abuse law is being violated routinely but that those
violations are acknowledged as not threatening the public inter-
est. Indeed, they further the public interest and are needed to
improve the functioning of the health care marketplace. Lack of
prosecution leaves the industry living with economically and
socially appropriate conduct .... In sum, the modem health
care industry is akin to a speakeasy - conduct that is illegal is
rampant and countenanced by law enforcement officials because
the law is so out of sync with the conventional norms and reali-
ties of the marketplace and because respected leaders of the
industry are performing tasks that, while illegal, are desirable in
improving the functioning of the market.'
This sentiment has been voiced by other scholars and health
law practitioners alike."
77. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 988 (1985). See also United States v.
Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 35 (10 Cir. 1989) (holding that
essentially any amount of inducement is illegal).
78. Blumstein, supra note 73, at 213.
79. Id. at218.
80. See Farley, supra note 75, at 173; David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and
Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a 'Competitive' Health Care Era, 19 LOY. U. CMt. LJ., 1133
(1988) (commenting on the effectiveness of the statute and its changing interpretations).
Although the statute was an effective and logical response to fraud and abuse under a
cost-based system, it may be inappropriate to apply the same rules to the newly com-
petitive health care environment. The statute is broadly worded and appears to prohibit
many arrangements that pose little risk to the integrity of the program or the quality of
medical care.
Id. at 1135. See, e.g., Robert Fabrikant, Health Care Reform: The Use of the Anti-Kickback
Statutes in Private Litigation, and the Need for an Antitrust-Type Approach, in HEALTH CARE
REFoRm LAW INsTrrtrE 453, 455 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 700, 1994) (proposing that anti-kickback statutes may retard the development of relationships
between providers that are necessary for healthcare reform). See also Sheldon Krantz & Stan
Soya, Courts Restrict Creative Enforcement of Health Care Fraud Laws, 6 LEGAL OPINION
LETTER, Dec. 18, 1996, (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.).
While 'kickback' sounds like an evil thing, existing statutory language reaches
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One Circuit Court has adopted a narrower interpretation of
the anti-kickback statute than the "one purpose" test originated
in Greber. In Hanlester Network v. Shalala,' the Ninth Cir-
cuit limited the scope of prohibited conduct under the anti-
kickback statute by strictly reading the statute's scienter re-
quirements. The court construed 'knowingly and willingly' as
requiring that the defendant knew that the statute prohibited
offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals, and then
engaged in prohibited conduct with the specific intent to dis-
obey the law.82 "Thus, a good faith belief that one's conduct
was not prohibited by the anti-kickback provision would con-
stitute a defense."83
The heightened scienter requirement put forth in Hanlester
has been widely debated in the literature. While many com-
mentators appear ready to adopt it, 84the obvious downfall of
the holding is that the heightened scienter requirement would
make criminal convictions more difficult to obtain. "Although
the Ninth Circuit's rulings are not binding on federal courts in
other circuits, the Hanlester decision resulted from a 'test case'
and thus could have considerable impact on subsequent federal
jurisprudence. In addition, many states.., have enacted stat-
utes that are substantially similar to the anti-kickback provi-
sion, and those states may look to Hanlester for guidance."85
activities that fall far short of nefarious conduct .... Improper kickbacks and bribes
cannot be condoned and should be dealt with harshly. Because the anti-kickback
statutes and regulations, on their face, also proscribe many activities that should not be
the subject of criminal prosecution or even civil enforcement, they have to be used
with caution to avoid undue interference with the marketplace.
Id.
81. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring the
government to satisfy the "knowingly and willfully" scienter requirement of the anti-kickback
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(b)(1-2), by establishing that the defendant knew his conduct was
unlawful and acted anyway).
82. See id. at 1400.
83. Avanzato & Wollin, supra note 6, at 12.
84. See, e.g., William R. Kucera, Jr., Note, Hanlester Network v. Shalala: A Model Ap-
proach to the Medicare and Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 413, 446-49 (1996)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the anti-kickback statute benefits the
regulation of Medicare and Medicaid fraud); Vavonese, supra note 6 (concluding that requiring
proof of knowledge of the law under the Hanlester holding is both legally sound and consistent
with public policy); Richard P. Kusserow, The Medicare and MedicaidAnti-Kickback Statute and
the Safe Harbor Regulations-What Next? 2 HEALTH MATRIX 49, 63-70 (1992) (endorsing the
Hanlester decision).
85. Avanzato & Wollin, supra note 6, at 12.
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Nonetheless, other courts have not adopted this interpretation.
Recognizing the effect the over-expansiveness of the stat-
ute was creating on the healthcare market, in 1987 Congress
directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create
regulations immunizing certain specific practices which would
otherwise be illegal under the statute. 6 While thirteen "safe
harbors" have since been issued,' many commentators feel
they offer little guidance in structuring provider arrangements
when compared with the vast scope of prohibited conduct
under the fraud and abuse statute."8 These technically illegal
but immunized exceptions are referred to as "safe harbors."
Shortly after the first safe harbors were issued, former Inspec-
tor General of the United States Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Richard Kusserow, explained these safe harbors
and indicated that additional guidance as to the proper interpre-
tation of the anti-kickback statute could be found in Fraud
Alert bulletins issued by the Department of Health & Human
Services, forthcoming "interpretive rules" which the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) planned on issuing, and from pub-
lished administrative and judicial decisions as more violations
are prosecuted. 9 Unfortunately, the guidance provided by the
86. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Act, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14(a), 101
Stat. 680, 685 (1987).
87. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(1994).
88. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 224.
The present safe harbor regulations carefully delineate thirteen payment practices that
are not criminal offenses or civil violations. The safe-harbor regulations set forth with
particularity practices which, if adhered to strictly, are not fraud and abuse offenses
.... The narrowly drawn cast to the safe harbors means that in many situations the
safe harbors give little real guidance ... [while] failure to fall within a safe harbor puts
providers at peril when devising innovative arrangements that use financial incentives.
Id. See also Kusserow, supra note 84. The safe harbor regulations are codified in 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952 (1994). In addition to these, eight additional safe harbors have been proposed by the
Department of Health and Human Services. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the OIG Anti-Kickback Statute, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008
(1993) (proposing additional safe harbors) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.1001) (proposed Sept.
21, 1993); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the OIG
Safe Harbor Anti-Kickback Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202 (1994) (summarizing and describing
proposed changes to the safe harbor provisions) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.1001); Medicare
and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors for Protecting Health Plans, 61
Fed. Reg. 2122 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.1001) (setting forth various standards and
guidelines for safe harbor provisions designed to protect certain health care programs). While
these proposed safe harbors do not create definite boundaries between legal and illegal behavior,
they give fairly broad guidance.
89. Kusserow, supra note 84, at 62-63. "In contrast to the safe harbor regulations which
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OIG has been minimal, and legal precedent is sparse, as set-
tlements are commonplace. Because of the limited guidance,
providers have been left on their own to navigate the vast
prohibitions of the anti-kickback statute.
Congress has recently addressed the ambiguity of the
Fraud and Abuse statute with the enactment of the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA).90
Section 205 of the Act sets forth a three-pronged program in-
tended by Congress to help assist providers in the understanding
of the fraud and abuse laws, which are frequently criticized for
being vague and overly broad. In addition to provisions requir-
ing the OIG to solicit and respond to proposals for modifica-
tions to the Safe Harbor regulations on an annual basis, and
mandating a formal process under which so-called "Fraud
Alerts" may be requested, the law enacts a compulsory process
for seeking and issuing advisory written opinions.9'
While these provisions are a good step toward clarifying the
scope of prohibited conduct under the Fraud and Abuse statute,
the actual effect these provisions will have in the future is
questionable as their passage has been fought by enforcement
agencies. Especially contentious is the provision requiring the
Department of Health and Human Services (IHS) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue advisory opinions to
individual providers on whether a proposed business venture
violates the Fraud and Abuse Anti-Kickback statute.92
specify conduct immune from prosecution, the Fraud Alerts highlight areas where OIG has
particular concerns because of the impact of certain practices on the health care programs." Id.
The planned interpretive rules were to "clarify ambiguities in a particular safe harbor or a conflict
between two or more safe harbors. [They will not] address whether a specific fact situation falls
within a safe harbor, but rather will explain terms or resolve other questions of more general
applicability." Id.
90. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.A. §1320a-7d
(West 1997) (describing guidelines for understanding HIPAA).
91. See Thomas S. Crane et al., Congress Strengthens Anti-Fraud andAbuse Juggernaut, 5
HEALTH LAW RE'. (BNA) 37 (Sept. 19, 1996) (discussing the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996).
92. Id. See also Republicans Reject Democratic Concerns Over Health Bill, Push For
Quick Action, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY 2, July 30, 1996.
The advisory provisions of [proposed HIPAA] has outraged Justice officials, who say
it would weaken their hand substantially in prosecuting violations if they had given
advance approval, even if the proposals were based on misleading or incomplete in-
formation from the providers. Attorney General Janet Reno has appealed personally to
House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee Chairman Bill Thomas (R-Calif) to
drop the provision, according to White House and congressional sources.
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Moreover, debating the potential effectiveness of the advi-
sory opinion provision may be moot since there have already
been proposals to repeal it. President Clinton's proposed bud-
get for 1998 suggested repealing this provision because of the
belief that the advice-giving process would hinder the ability to
prosecute providers.93 The underlying fear is that some pro-
viders would obtain favorable advisory opinions under false
pretenses and then hide behind them later to defraud the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs.94 Furthermore, in March of
1997, Health and Human Services Inspector General, June
Gibbs Brown, stated that the administration would soon release
legislation proposing the repeal of HIPAA section 205.95 In
opposition to these efforts, health care providers, including the
American Medical Association, have strongly supported the
advisory opinion provision.' While HIPAA section 205's fate
remains unclear at this point, even if the section remains in
force, one has to wonder how anxious HHS and the DOJ will
be to give such guidance after having fought so strenuously
against such a provision in the past.
Despite the questionable future of section 205, HIPAA's
overall effect on the Fraud and Abuse statute is not clear. In
January of 1997, the Bureau of National Affairs advisory
board, which consists of twenty attorneys who specialize in
Id. Before HIPAA was passed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had been able to prevent the
passage of such a provision in the past with the argument that "fact-based rulings are
inappropriate in relation to a statute the application of which ultimately hinges on the intent of
individuals." Thomas S. Crane et al., supra note 91 (discussing fraud and abuse provisions in
HIPAA). "The HHS Office of Inspector General has also expressed its vehement opposition to the
plan, noting that the 'enormous resources' required to implement [HLPAA's] advisory opinion
requirement threaten to undermine the ongoing project of government downsizing." Scott D.
Godshall & Michael H. Friedman, New Options on the Anti-Kickback Laws: Getting Advice
That's Worth the Effort, BNA MEDICARE REP. 33, Sept. 20, 1996.
93. See The President's FY 1998 Budget Medicare Savings and Investment Proposals,
BNA MEDICARE REP., Feb. 14, 1997 (describing savings plans for Medicare through managed
care).
94. See id.
95. See BUREAU OF NAT. AFFAIRS, INc., Administration Readies Legislation to Repeal
Fraud and Abuse Provisions, BNA HEALTH L. REP. 11, Mar. 13, 1997 (citing June Gibbs
Brown's remarks at the March 6, 1997 press conference).
96. Physician Groups Urge Administration Not to Seek Repeal of New Provisions, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY 7, March 25,1997.
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health law, published the results of its annual survey.97 Sever-
al of its members stated that HIPAA "raises as many questions
as it answers."98 Marilou M. King, executive vice-president of
the National Health Lawyers Association, went so far as to say
that "[ilt's going to take years to sort out the new fraud and
abuse rules."" In short, it appears that providers are going to
face the same uncertainties in navigating the broad scope of
conduct prohibited by the Fraud and Abuse statute as they did
before the passage of HIPAA.
I. CONFLICT IN THE COURTS
Last year, two federal district courts grappled with the
question of whether a violation of the anti-kickback statute
constitutes a viable claim under the FCA.'" Specifically at
issue was whether a claim for payment submitted to Medicare
by a provider who is or was in violation of the anti-kickback
statute is rendered a "false claim" for FCA purposes by the
fact of the anti-kickback violation alone. The two courts came
to opposite conclusions.
97. See Consolidation Remains Top Legal Issue or Health Care Industry in New Year,
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 3, Jan. 2, 1997(indicating the composition of BNA's Health Law
Reporter's advisory board members).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The first case to address this issue was United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F.
Supp. 1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994). However, the court in Anthony allowed the plaintiff's qui tam
action to withstand a motion for dismissal without explaining the interplay between the FCA and
the Fraud and Abuse statute. The court merely held that "[u]nder the facts alleged, the plaintiff
could produce evidence that would show that the kickbacks allegedly paid to the defendant
physicians somehow tainted the claims for Medicare. Additionally, the plaintiff may establish that
the claims for Medicare were constructively false or fraudulent." Id. at 1506-07. As such, Roy v.
Anthony offers little insight into the question at hand. However, the court did state that "[m]erely
pointing to violations of the Fraud and Abuse statute will not suffice" to establish that the
defendants committed violations of the False Claims Act. Id. at 1506. See also United States ex
rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1507, 1510 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that
"[u]nfortunately, the court [in Anthony] gave little explanation for its decision").
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A. United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp
Inc 0 1
1. Case Summary
In this case, the plaintiff, A. Scott Pogue, alleged that his
former employer, Diabetes Treatment Centers of America
(DTCA), and its parent company, American Healthcorp, Inc.
(AHC), along with the West Paces Medical Center and several
other individual physicians and hospitals were involved in a
scheme by which individual physicians would refer their Medi-
care and Medicaid patients to West Paces Medical Treatment
for treatment in violation of the federal anti-kickback and self-
referral statutes."°
Pogue alleged that a violation of Medicare anti-kickback
and self-referral laws constitutes a violation of the FCA since
"participation in any federal program involves an implied cer-
tification that the participant will abide by and adhere to all
statutes, rules and regulations governing that program."'' 3 In
other words, Pogue did not "alleg[e] that the Defendants over-
charged Medicare or charged it for services not rendered, [rath-
er, he argued] that Defendants' failure to comply with Medi-
care laws prohibiting kickbacks and self-referrals [in and of
itself] rendered the Medicare claims submitted by the defen-
101. 914 F. Supp. 1507. Pogue initially had his suit dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The decision initially dismissing the
case, United States exreL Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., No. 3-94-0515, 1995 WL 626514
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1995) (memorandum) is not officially reported and contains additional
material regarding the facts of this case.
102. See Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1508. Mr. Pogue had a high-level position at the Diabetes
Treatment Centers of America (DTCA) as the Director for Marketing and Director of
Development. See United States ex rel Pogue v. American Heathcorp, Inc., 1995 WL 626514, at
1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1995). He held that position for 18 months before being fired. See id.
Shortly after his termination, Pogue hired an attorney to negotiate a covenant not to sue with
DTCA whereby he subsequently agreed to "release and forever discharge for himself, his heirs
successors, administrators and assigns, the Company, its agents, directors, officers or employees
from any and all legal claims, causes of action, agreements,.obligations, liabilities, damages and
or demands whatsoever at law or in equity, in any federal or state court or before any federal or
state commission, agency or board" in return for $13,000 and "the right to receive bonuses on
certain projects underway at the time... " Id. at 2. Although Pogue actively considered bringing
a qui tam action while he and his attorney were negotiating the release, the court found the
subsequent covenant not to sue unenforceable as against public policy. See id. at 3. The court
reasoned that enforcement of such a release with respect to qui tam actions would subvert the
purposes of the False Claims Act. See id. at 4.
103. Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1509.
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dants false or fraudulent."' 4
While the Pogue court recognized other court decisions
finding FCA liability based on violations of other statutes,
rules, and regulations, 5 the court hesitated to immediately
hold that violations of the Medicare anti-kickback and self-
referral laws could support an FCA claim because of apparent
inconsistency in Supreme Court precedent. The court stated:
Obviously the language of the False Claims Act and its legisla-
tive history have created a great deal of confusion among the
courts regarding the Act's applicability to claims that are not
themselves false but were derived through fraudulent conduct.
The Supreme Court may have only added to this confusion with
its somewhat conflicting holdings in Neifert-White that the False
Claims Act extends "to all fraudulent attempts to cause the
Government to pay out sums of money" and McNinch, that the
False Claims Act "was not designed to reach every kind of
fraud practiced on the Government."'' "°
After considering the above-mentioned precedent and the
FCA's legislative history, the Pogue court concluded that "the
False Claims Act was intended to govern not only fraudulent
acts that create a loss to the government, but also those fraudu-
lent acts that cause the government to pay out sums of money
to claimants it did not intend to benefit.""° Using this reason-
ing, the court allowed Pogue's case to survive defendant's
motion to dismiss because of Pogue's allegation that the gov-
ernment would not have reimbursed the defendants' Medicare
claims had it known of the defendants' anti-kickback and self-
referral violations.
104. Id. at 1510.
105. Specifically, the court cited and discussed the following two cases: Ab-Tech Constr.,
Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Ct. 429 (1994) (finding an FCA violation after the defendant
deliberately withheld from the Small Business Association knowledge of a prohibited contract
arrangement with a non-minority-owned enterprise), aff d 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and
United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (finding
that defendants were liable under the FCA for engaging in a tenant pre-selection scheme by which
they gave preferential treatment to white resident applicants for housing in violation of the
regulations governing the administration of a Community Development Block Grant Program
subsidized by the government with Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds). See Pogue,
914 F. Supp. 1507, at 1510-11.
106. Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1512 (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228,
233 (1968), and United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595,599 (1958)).
107. Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1513.
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2. Case Analysis
The weakness in the Pogue court's reasoning is that it
ignores the role of prosecutorial discretion in enforcing a stat-
ute that is over-expansive in the scope of conduct that it pro-
hibits." s As discussed, many providers today are operating in
technical violation of the anti-kickback statute because of the
lack of guidance as to what behavior is legal or illegal under
the anti-kickback statute."° Moreover, while many providers
are in technical violation of the statute, their violations some-
times result in actual savings to the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, more efficient delivery of health care, or an increase
in the quality of health care. ° While it would be naive to
say that all of those in violation of the anti-kickback statute are
"good violators," it would be equally naive to say that there
are no "bad" violators (i.e., providers who deliberately break
the anti-kickback provisions with the primary intention of
lining their own pockets) in the marketplace. Under the Pogue
holding, these "good violators" are subject to the same FCA
liabilities as "bad violators."
Likewise, prosecutors are given broad discretion in their
power to enforce the Fraud and Abuse statute when a violation
is found or suspected."' Prosecutors can make the distinction
between "good" and "bad" violators and enforce the statute
accordingly. The shortcoming of the Pogue holding is that it
assumes that the government will refuse to reimburse a
defendant's Medicare claims if the government learns that the
defendant has violated the anti-kickback provisions in any way.
In other words, it ignores the fact that a prosecutor's discretion
could lead her to refuse to prosecute an anti-kickback violation
which she believes does not harm the Medicare or Medicaid
programs or the public interest in general."' The effect of
108. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 210.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
110. Id.
111. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 218.
112. It should be noted that there is no safe harbor or other exception for providers who can
prove that their technical violation of the anti-kickback statute actually results in savings to the
government. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 210 (stating that "it is not a defense to prove that
program costs are being reduced [since] [n]o statutory (or administrative) safe harbor based on the
reduction of Medicare and Medicaid program costs exists"); Hyman & Williamson, supra note
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this shortcoming is to essentially allow any private individual
to enforce the broad prohibitions of the fraud and abuse provi-
sions via the FCA's qui tam provisions for their own personal
gain. This, along with the increased incentive to bring suit
resulting from the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, will serve to
increase the potential liability of providers, forcing them to
undertake various costly, preventive measures."1
B. United States ex rel. Thompson v. ColumbialHCA
Heafthcere Crporation"4i.tase summary
Seven months after the Middle District of Tennessee's
decision in Pogue,1 ' the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of Texas ruled on essentially the same claim brought
by a physician in private practice, James M. Thompson, against
his competitor, Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation." 6
80, at 1193-96 (suggesting that conduct which does not result in harm to the Medicare or
Medicaid programs or beneficiaries should not be illegal).
113. See infra pp. 114-15.
114. United States exrel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399
(S.D. Tex. 1996).
115. United States ex reL Pogue v. American Healthcorp Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996).
116. Id. at 400. Pogue and Thompson's claims are similar in so far as they allege the False
Claims Act was violated because the defendants submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid
while in violation of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback laws and/or the Stark prohibitions
on physician self-referrals. Thompson specifically alleged that Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation violated the statutes prohibiting referrals by:.
1) Offering physicians in a position to refer patients an exclusive opportunity not
available to other qualified investors to invest in "partnerships" to own defendants'
hospitals, and receive profits therefrom;
2) Offering loans or providing assistance in obtaining bank loans to invest in these
"partnership's;"
3) Repayment of capital investments disguised as "consultation fees;"
4) Free and below market rent for offices near defendant's hospitals;
5) Expense-paid vacations and educational opportunities for physicians and medical
technicians in a position to refer patients;
6) Payments to physicians and medical technicians in positions to influence referrals
based on the number and amount of patient-days used, or procedures scheduled;
7) Creating lucrative financial arrangements with physician-owned entities which
induce physicians to practice at defendants' hospitals;
8) Making payments to physicians and physicians' groups in the form of "rent" for
vacant space, or space "rented" at an excessive rate;
9) Forgiveness of the cost of above-standard leasehold improvements to space
occupied by physicians in defendants' Medical Office Building;
10) Income guarantees to physicians who agree to practice at the defendants' hospitals.
Id. at 401. Thompson alleged that Columbia/HCA violated the FCA "by fraudulently concealing
their illegal actions under the anti-kickback statute and Stark laws by filing false certificates of
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Specifically, Thompson asserted that Columbia/HCA had sub-
mitted Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Form
2552s which contained fraudulent certifications. These forms
not only specifically warn those completing the form of possi-
ble liability from misrepresenting or falsifying any information
on them, but also specifically direct the completer to the anti-
kickback prohibitions. 17 Thompson further claimed that this
compliance certificate also "requires the hospital administrator
to execute a statement certifying that he is familiar with the
laws and regulations regarding the provision of healthcare ser-
vices and that the services identified in the cost report were
provided in compliance with the anti-fraud statute.""'
In response to Thompson's allegations, Columbia/HCA
argued that even if it did violate the anti-kickback or Stark
laws and it did submit a Form 2552 for Medicare reimburse-
ment which contained false information, the filing of the false
certification did not, by itself, render the related claims for
payment false or fraudulent." 9 It asserted that "even if [they]
have violated the anti-kickback laws or Stark laws the govern-
ment would have paid the Medicare claims since there is no
allegation that the services rendered were not medically neces-
sary or otherwise false or fraudulent. In other words,.., even
if the alleged kickbacks and prohibited financial relationships
might cause a doctor to refer a patient to one hospital rather
than another, that does not mean the services rendered to the
patient were unnecessary or the resulting Medicare claim was
false or fraudulent."'20
compliance with the statutes and billing the government for the services even though the services
were rendered in violation of the Medicare statutes." Id. at 403.
117. According to the Thompson court, form 2552 contains the following warning:
Misrepresentation or falsification of any information contained in this cost report may
be punishable by criminal, civil and administrative action, fine and/or imprisonment
under federal law. Furthermore, if services identified in this report were provided or
procured through the payment directly or indirectly of a kickback or were otherwise
illegal, criminal, civil and administrative fines and/or imprisonment may result.
Id. at 406. Thompson cited to United States v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (indicating that false HCFA 2552 certifications are a proper basis for liability
under the FCA). Id.
118. Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 406.
119. Seeid.at402-03.
120. Id. In essence, Columbia/HCA argued that "a false statement is not coterminous with a
false claim." Id. at 406. In support of this proposition, Columbia/HCA cited United States v. Hill,
676 F.Supp. 1158, 1174 (N.D.FI. 1987). Id. at 406.
[Vol. 8:83
MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE & QUI TAM
The parties in Thompson argued the same precedent that
was argued in Pogue.' The court in Thompson, similarly,
cited much of the same language from those cases as did the
court in Pogue." However, unlike the court in Pogue, the
court in Thompson was constrained to follow the holding of
United States ex reL Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc.," and to
reach the opposite conclusion. 24 The court stated:
In Equifax, the Fifth Circuit held that there is no indication that
the FCA is intended to be used as a private enforcement device
for the Anti-Pinkerton Act. By the same reasoning, the FCA
would not be intended to be used as a private enforcement
device for the Medicare Anti-Kickback statute and Stark laws.
Despite the rash of district court decisions outside the Fifth
Circuit that hold to the contrary, this Court must follow Fifth
Circuit law that still requires that a claim itself be false or
fraudulent in order for liability under the FCA to exist. Thomp-
son has not stated a claim unless he has sufficiently alleged that
the defendants have submitted claims that are false or fraudu-
lent (i.e., claims or claim amounts that the government would
not have had to pay but for the fraud). Allegations that medical
services were rendered in violation of Medicare anti-fraud stat-
utes do not, by themselves, state a claim for relief under the
FCA. 2
On October 23, 1997, the Fifth Circuit granted new life to
Thompson's claim. 1" Recognizing its previous decision in
Equifax' and the Ninth Circuit's approach in United States
ex rel. Hopper v. Anton," the court stated that "where the
government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a
claimant's certification of compliance with, for example, a
statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent
121. See cases cited supra notes 105-06.
122. Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 403-04.
123. 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
124. United States ex reL Weinberger v. Equifax Inc. [hereinafter Equifax] was cited in both
Pogue and Thompson as authority supporting the proposition that "the False Claims Act was not
designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the government." 557 F.2d 456, 460 (5' Cir.
1977) (quoting United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958)).
125. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399,
405 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
126. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., No. 96-40868,
1997 WL 619314 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997).
127. 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977).
128. 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996).
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claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that
statute or regulation."'29 With regards to Thompson's claims,
the court was "unable to determine . . . whether, or to what
extent, payment for services identified in defendants' annual
cost reports was conditioned on defendants' certifications of
compliance.'1 3' As such, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district
court's dismissal of Thompson's claim and remanded this issue
back to the district court "for further factual development."'
It should be noted that Thompson, in his district court
case, had alleged that the defendants had submitted claims for
medically unnecessary services in his Second Amended Com-
plaint. 2 Thompson's evidence to support this claim consisted
of statistical studies which concluded that forty percent of the
Medicare claims for services rendered by Columbia/HCA's
physicians who were in arrangements violating the anti-kick-
back statute were for services that were medically unneces-
sary. 3 However, the district court found that Thompson had
not met his pleading burden under Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that averments of
fraud be pleaded "with particularity."' 34 While the district
court recognized its right to allow Thompson to replead these
allegations in compliance with Rule 9(b), the court refused to
do so and dismissed the case. 35
129. Thompson, No. 96-40868, 1997 WL 619314, at n.4.
130. lId
131. Id.
132. United States exreL Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F.Supp. 399,
406 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
133. See id. at 406-07.
134. See id. at 406. FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) states "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." The court in
Thompson stated.
Thompson has not met his pleading burden with respect to his allegation that the FCA
was violated due to the submission of claims for services that were not medically
necessary since he has not alleged that any specific physicians referred patients for
such services or that any specific claims were filed for such services. Thompson did
not assert that the defendants were submitting claims for services which were not
medically necessary until the filing of his Second Amended Complaint, which was
after defendants filed their initial motions to dismiss.
Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 407.
135. Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 407. ("So while leave could be granted for Thompson to
replead in compliance with Rule 9(b), the Court declines to do so since this allegation appears to
be a last minute effort by Thompson to avoid dismissal of the case based on the statutory
violations of Medicare.").
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While Thompson's appeal in the Fifth Circuit was pend-
ing, several large constituencies loaned support to their respec-
tive interests in the case. 36 Regardless, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision that on this issue,
Thompson's complaint failed to satisfy the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 137 The court stated that
'Thompson provided no factual basis for his belief that defen-
dants submitted claims for medically unnecessary services
other than his reference to statistical studies. There is no indi-
cation, however, that these studies directly implicate defen-
dants." 38
2. Case Analysis
While the decision in Pogue illustrates the shortcomings in
136. The American Hospital Association (AHA) filed an amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit
asking that the district court decision be affirmed. See Stark Seeks DOJ Intervention in
ColumbiaIHCA False Claims Case, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY 6, Apr. 24, 1997. The AHA
maintained that "use of the False Claims Act in cases where there is no injury to the public fise, as
in cases alleging violations of the anti-kickback and self-referral law, is 'abusive' and 'beyond the
scope of the Act.'" Id. In opposition to this, Rep. Fortney H. Stark (D-Calif) filed an amicus brief
asking the Fifth Circuit to reverse its decision and conclude that violations of the Medicare anti-
kickback statute and the Stark prohibitions constitute FCA violations. See Stark, Koop, Todd,
Relman File Amicus Briefs in False Claims Case, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY 2, Jan. 2, 1997.
Likewise, former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, Harvard Medical School Professor
Arnold S. Relman, and James S. Todd, former executive vice-president of the American Medical
Association, also filed amicus briefs to the Fifth Circuit asking for reversal of the decision. See id.
'Their brief stated that it did not seek to offer any additional insights into the construction of the
False Claims Act or its application to the factual allegations of the case .... Id. In the brief they
maintained that the "self-referral and compensation arrangements at issue in... [Thompson]
threaten to erode traditional medical ethics, undermine public trust, and create irreconcilable
conflicts of interest at a time when the public at large will be ill served thereby." Id.
137. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., No. 96-40868,
1997 WL 619314, at n.5 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997). The Fifth Circuit stated:
At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires that the plaintiff set forth the "who, what, when,
where, and how" of the alleged fraud. Williams v. WMX Tech., Onc., 112 F.3d 175,
179 (5th Cir. 1997). Thompson argues, however, that the pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b) are relaxed where, as here, the facts relating to the alleged fraud are
peculiarly within the perpetrator's knowledge. Although we have held that fraud may
be pled on information and belief under such circumstances, we have also warned that
this exception "must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation
and conclusory allegations." See Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp. 14 F.3d
1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994). In addition, even where allegations are based on
information and belief, the complaint must set forth a factual basis for such belief.
Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1279 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Neubronner v. Milken 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993).
138. Id.
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finding that a violation of the anti-kickback statute renders a
claim for payment to Medicare a per se false claim for FCA
purposes, the district court's decision in Thompson exposes the
weakness of the opposite rule. In Thompson there appeared to
be convincing evidence that Columbia/HCA was a "bad viola-
tor" of the anti-kickback statute. If we adhere to the rule that a
violation of the anti-kickback statute does not render a claim to
Medicare or Medicaid a per se false claim for FCA purposes,
we may allow "bad violators" to go unpunished, as such fraud
may not be uncovered absent the private enforcement mecha-
nism of the FCA's qui tam provisions.
IV. ANALYSIS
Should a violation of the anti-kickback statute constitute a
per se viable claim under the FCA? The optimal result would
be to amend the anti-kickback statute in a way that clearly
delineates prohibited and lawful behavior and which tolerates
provider arrangements designed for competition in the prospec-
tive payment era.'39 However, in light of our experience with
the Fraud and Abuse statute and with the new HIPAA, the only
thing that seems clear is that more guidance on the anti-kick-
back statute is unlikely to come soon."4 The alternative to
amending the Fraud and Abuse statute is amending the FCA.
However, this alternative is unlikely to yield a substantially
better result since tinkering with the FCA involves consider-
ations extending beyond the scope of health law, let alone the
scope of the anti-kickback provisions. In the absence of ambi-
tious legislative overhaul, we are currently left with two poten-
tial default rules. This section examines the pros and cons of
139. As mentioned earlier, the weaknesses in the Fraud and Abuse statute have been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature.
140. However, the U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the issue of whether "a re-
lator could assert a cause of action under the False Claims Act for a regulatory violation even if
the alleged violation did not and could not cause a financial loss to the United States."AHA, AMA,
AAMC File Amicus Brief in Supreme Court Whistleblower Case, BNA HEALTH CAE DAILY 8,
Dec. 13, 1996. The case under consideration originated in the Ninth Circuit and is labelled
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel Schumer, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 950-1340. The result
could have significant implications for health care providers since it, in effect, would create a safe
harbor for conduct which saved money under Medicare and Medicaid in so far as FCA claims are
concerned. As discussed, there currently is no such safe harbor under the Fraud and Abuse statute.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (West 1997).
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each.
A. Why A Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute Should Per
Se Constitute a Viable FCA Claim.
There are several reasons that explain that a violation of
the anti-kickback statute constitutes an FCA claim. First, the
amount of fraud that occurs within our nation's health care
system is enormous. 4' If private individuals are allowed to
help combat this fraud through the qui tam provisions, the
amount of health care fraud would be reduced because, pre-
sumably, more violators would be caught or exposed, and
likewise, more potential fraud perpetrators would be deterred.
Given the large increase in the number of qui tam suits that
have been filed since the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, such
a result appears likely. 42
Moreover, anti-kickback violations are arguably more
difficult for the government to detect when compared to false
claims for services that were not medically necessary or were
not performed. False claims premised on anti-kickback viola-
tions result from the structure of financial arrangements among
providers. The only way these can be detected would be for the
Attorney General to open a provider's books and examine that
provider's organizational structure and its related contracts.
Without any reasonable cause to investigate or a starting point
for investigation, such access and information is difficult for
enforcement officials to obtain.
However, false claims premised on the submission of
claims for medically unnecessary procedures or for unper-
formed procedures could be found by examining the claims
received from providers. In other words, from an enforcement
standpoint, a private cause of action through qui tam may be
better suited to detecting anti-kickback violations than false
claims. As such, qui tam actions are especially valuable in the
anti-kickback context because, in uncovering fraud, the govern-
ment relies more on information provided by relators.
Second, although relying on prosecutorial discretion could
141. See supra pp. 81-8 2 .
142. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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ostensibly protect "good violators" of the anti-kickback stat-
ute,143 prosecutorial discretion is prone to abuse and could be
used to protect "bad violators."'" In other words, by not al-
lowing an anti-kickback violation to constitute a per se viable
claim under the FCA, enforcement of the statute is limited to
those providers whom the Attorney General or the OIG choos-
es to pursue. While enforcement officials could use this discre-
tion to prosecute only those persons in serious violation of the
anti-kickback statute, this discretion can also be abused to
harass those who commit minor violations or to protect those
in flagrant violation of the statutes.
Third, as discussed previously, one of the most significant
criticisms of the anti-kickback statute is the lack of guidance as
to what conduct is legal and what is illegal. 45 If qui tam suits
based on allegations of anti-kickback violations are allowed,
the judicial precedent interpreting the anti-kickback statute
presumably would be expanded and developed. By adding to
the judicial interpretation of the anti-kickback statute, qui tam
suits in this area could help providers navigate the breadth of
the statute's prohibitions.
B. Why A Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute Should Not
Constitute a Per Se Viable FCA Claim
For every reason in support of allowing qui tam suits
based on violations of the anti-kickback statute, there is a more
convincing reason to not allow these suits.
1. Providers who are in technical violation of the anti-
kickback statute may be trying to reduce program costs
instead of trying to defraud Medicare
While the problem of health care fraud is admittedly great,
many commentators believe that much of the conduct prohibit-
ed by the anti-kickback statute is actually beneficial to the
Medicare and Medicaid systems, helps to reduce overall health
143. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
144. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 218 (discussing how demands of the marketplace
require industry leaders to perform illegal tasks that improve the market).
145. See supra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
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care costs, or improves the quality of health care."4 Since
reduction of health care costs is the primary rationale behind
the Fraud and Abuse statute, 47 we should hesitate to allow
all violations of the anti-kickback statute to be actionable under
the FCA's qui tam provisions. Prosecutors recognize that due
to the expansiveness of the anti-kickback provisions, some
providers' "illegal" conduct is more egregious than others.
Allowing any private individual to bring a qui tam claim would
subject those in "mild" violation to liability when the govern-
ment itself would not prosecute such behavior.
2. There is no need for additional private fraud enforcement
efforts
While one could argue that the government may not prose-
cute all violations of the anti-kickback statute because of limit-
ed governmental resources, this is not entirely convincing in
light of the newly enacted Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act:
The Act delivers extraordinary resources to the Department of
Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and intermediaries and carriers.
Specifically, without further appropriations, the OIG will re-
ceive $60-$70 million in funding for 1997 which will increase
to $150-$160 million through the year 2000 for Medicare and
Medicaid program activity; the FBI will receive $47 million for
1997 and up to $114 million for 2002, and intermediaries and
carriers will receive $430-$440 million for 1997 and up to $720
million for 2002 for program integrity functions. These funds
are, however, merely a deposit into the kitty because the Act
creates a bounty system for investigators. Funds collected from
providers for violations of the law and from settlements and
asset forfeitures are to be placed into the Fraud and Abuse Con-
trol Account to be recycled for new fraud and abuse busting
activities."4
Given the way the damages provisions of the FCA are struc-
146. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
148. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936, 1994-95 (listing resources allocated for enforcement).
149. Crane et al., supra note 91.
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tured, there is no reason why the government should refuse to
prosecute a valid claim for lack of resources since any govern-
ment victory would clearly pay for itself."5 Similarly, the
federal government's commitment to fighting health care fraud
is well-established. Health care fraud "is the second priority of
the United States Department of Justice, after violent crime. A
criminal and civil health care fraud coordinator is now present
in every United States Attorney's Office. '5
3. Allowing Qui Tam Opens the Door to Many Frivolous and
Retributive Suits
Furthermore, the argument that more violations of the anti-
kickback statute would be flushed out by private enforcement
is mitigated by the fact that the wrong people would presum-
ably be the ones bringing the qui tam actions. At least one
commentator has suggested that qui tam suits are often brought
only to harass and has provided some admittedly crude empiri-
cal evidence to support his assertion.
Some relators have filed qui tam actions merely to harass their
former employer or to add personal leverage to [another] per-
sonal claim .... From fiscal year 1987 through Sept. 10, 1996,
1,434 qui tam actions were filed. The government intervened in
only 209 cases. Recoveries have occurred in only 39 cases
where the government chose not to intervene, and the total
amount recovered in those cases represents only 1% of the
government's total recoveries under the FCA during the same
period. The large number of cases declined by the government
suggests that there have been many frivolous cases filed, like
Millner, for the purpose of harassing a defendant or attempting
to leverage a larger settlement on a personal claim [concurrently
filed with the qui tam action].'
150. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West 1997).
151. Bucy, supra note 25, at 693-94 (citing Medicare & Medicaid Fraud & Abuse: Hearings
before the subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs of the House Comm.
on Govt. Reform and Oversight, 104 Cong., I' Sess. *2 (June 15, 1995) (statement of Gerald M.
Stem, Special Counsel, Health Care Fraud, Department of Justice), available in 1995 WL
360342).
152. Mark R. Troy, Qui Tam Settlements: Is the Government Being Shortchanged?,
ANDREwS HEALTH CARE FkAUD Lma. REP. 3, Dec. 1996 (citing Millner v. lIT Corp., No.
1:92cv9, unpublished order (N.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 1995)). According to Troy, in Millner, "the court
held that the qui tam action was frivolous and was 'calculated to harass rIT and cause it as much
harm as possible."' Id.
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It should be noted that the plaintiff in Pogue was a dis-
gruntled employee who brought suit after he was fired.'53 The
plaintiff in Thompson was a local physician who brought suit
against his large competitor, Columbia/HCAY 4 The qui tam
provisions are structured to encourage whistleblowers to come
forth and report behavior that defrauds the government by
giving them a large bounty if a violation is found. In passing
the 1986 Amendments, Congress realized that many of the
people bringing qui tam claims would be current or former
employees of the defendant, since only an employee would
have the detailed knowledge of the fraud to bring the claim in
the first place. Presumably, a portion of the generous bounty
afforded to such individuals is calculated to help compensate
these individuals for any future retribution taken against them
by current or former employers. Thus, insofar as the relator is
concerned, the qui tam provisions are structured to provide a
shield for coming forward and reporting the fraud. If, in reali-
ty, the qui tam provisions are actually being used as a sword
against former employers and competitors, the spirit of the qui
tam statute is being violated, since the relator is not attempting
to make the government whole, but rather is merely trying to
punish the defendant. Likewise, if the majority of qui tam
actions that are brought in spite of the government's refusal to
prosecute the claim are frivolous as the statistics above sug-
gest, it is difficult to believe that allowing this private cause of
action is truly flushing out more fraud.
4. Allowing Qui Tam Places Large Costs on Providers
The threat of a qui tam suit forces providers and other
government contractors to assume costs beyond those associat-
ed with defending or settling a suit. We have already seen that
the penalty provisions of the FCA encourage defendants to
settle.' In addition to the expense of threatened litigation
and the potential catastrophic penalties that could be faced if
litigation were to proceed unsuccessfully, there is always the
153. See supra note 103.
154. Thompson, 938 F.Supp. 399,400-01.
155. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West 1997).
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cost of negative publicity inherent in going to court, especially
where allegations of fraud are involved. Furthermore, the mere
threat of a qui tam suit could raise costs for providers that
undertake preventive measures.
"Finns may adopt costly safeguards to reduce the likeli-
hood of a qui tam suit," such as employment screening to
identify employees with personality and character traits sug-
gesting strong tendencies toward conformity and loyalty."
This not only increases the costs of hiring and promotion but
also may shape the employer's workforce in an undesirable
way by disfavoring creative or assertive individuals.'57 Also,
"qui tam monitoring may increase the importance of consensus
as a decision-making objective because achieving consensus re-
duces the possibility that individual employee will believe that
favored approaches were improperly rejected."'58  While
achieving consensus is expensive and time-consuming in and
of itself, it can also yield decisions that "are suboptimal in
their tendency to incorporate compromise positions which
satisfy potential holdouts but fail to make needed choices or
respond adequately to specific, [difficult] problems." '159
Another way that providers have attempted to address
potential qui tam liability for anti-kickback violations is
through the establishment of corporate compliance pro-
grams."6 These programs are aimed at preventing and detect-
ing violations of federal and state law through employee partic-
ipation. One of the main impetuses behind creating these pro-
grams is the fact that "the sentencing guidelines award substan-
tial credit to a corporation convicted of a crime if the company
had a corporate compliance program in place before the of-
fense occurred and if the company reports the offense to the
U.S. Attorney's Office as soon as possible.'' The cost of
156. Kovacic, supra note 33, at 1827.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Jeannine Mjoseth, Health Attorneys See Rapid Growth in Adoption of Compliance
Plans, 5 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 33 (1996) (detailing the need for and characteristics of recent
health care organizations' compliance plans). "Health care attorneys are seeing 'tremendous
growth' in the development of compliance plans by health care providers, driven by high profile
fraud settlements and numerous qui tam suits .... " Id.
161. New Fraud, Abuse Laws 'Real Sleeper,' Show Need for Good Compliance Plans,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY 2, Aug. 27, 1996 (quoting Illene Nagel, commissioner of the U.S.
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these programs is presumably high due to the employee hours
involved and the fact that outside counsel should coordinate the
compliance program in order to take advantage of attorney-
client privilege in case of an investigation and to keep any
investigation "under the direction of an attorney if something
discoverable were to take place."162 On the other hand, the
costs for developing these plans is tax deductible. 63 Howev-
er, as discussed in the next section, the potential for lucrative
windfalls from successful qui tam suits may outweigh the
benefits of these programs.
5. Allowing Qui Tam Frustrates Providers' Own Attack
Against Fraud
"A compliance program reduces the likelihood of civil and
criminal wrongdoing, gives a realistic view of the company, es-
tablishes a structure to disseminate legal and policy changes
quickly, maximizes use of the attorney/client privilege, and
speeds responses to lawsuits and investigations." '  Regard-
less, these benefits to the provider can be undermined by the
lucrative benefits the qui tam provisions offer to employees.
Qui tam enforcement can undermine internal compliance
mechanisms in two ways. 65 First, an employee may choose
to file a qui tam suit instead of going through any internal anti-
fraud mechanism the provider may have established." Simi-
larly, the provider's internal compliance officials may deliber-
ately avoid correcting any fraud in order to lay the foundation
for their own, larger qui tam actions. 67 In short, the lucra-
tiveness of the qui tam action itself is more persuasive than
participation in an employer's anti-fraud mechanism, thus
reducing the effectiveness of such mechanisms.
Sentencing Commission from 1985-1994).
162. Charles Pereyra-Suarez & Carole A. Kove, Ring Around the White Collar: Defending
Fraud and Abuse, 18 WHriTER L. REV. 31, 36 (1996) (discussing how some corporate clients
prefer to have compliance coordinated by outside counsel in order to avoid internal investigation).
163. Advantages of Corporate Compliance Plan in "Age of Fraud" Are Touted, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY 7, Apr. 4,1995.
164. Id.
165. Kovacic, supra note 33, at 1831.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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6. Allowing qui tam frustrates the government's fight against
fraud
When the 1986 Amendments to the FCA were being de-
bated in Congress, the Department of Justice itself opposed an
amendment to the Act that would allow a private individual to
continue pursuing their claim after the government refused to
pick it up and prosecute it." The DOJ gave several reasons
for its opposition. The DOJ believed that:
Absent the absolute right to control litigation, DOJ could not
completely direct the course of litigation, including the right to
settle certain issues or dismiss claims against particular parties.
Therefore, DOJ would lose its prosecutorial autonomy. Forced
to compromise with a stubborn relator harboring a different
agenda, DOJ would be unable to negotiate settlements favorable
to the government and to consider other factors, such as its own
time and resources. Instead, DOJ might be forced to litigate
claims to judicial resolution, satisfying relators' agenda for a
guilty verdict, but wasting government resources for marginal
government gains. 69
Furthermore, "[w]hen DOJ is informed of a qui tam suit, it
must do more than decide whether a claim is meritorious and
worth pursuing: it must also decide whether to intervene in a
case that has already been brought.. .. [This] compromises
DOJ's autonomy, because DOJ must pick up and investigate
that case within sixty days to determine how the government
will handle it."'70
In addition to noting the differing objectives of the gov-
ernment and relators, the DOJ also opposed allowing private
citizens to continue qui tam claims without the government
168. See Kolis, supra note 18, at 413 (citing FALSE CLAIMS REFORM ACT: HEARINGS ON
S.1562 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1985) at 20 (testimony of Jay B. Stephens,
Deputy Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice)). "The Department of Justice
(DOJ) believed that the qui tam provisions, created originally during an era when the United
States did not have true investigative bodies, were superfluous in modern times .... Further, DOJ
felt that only occasionally would a qui tam relator unearth an instance of fraud that otherwise
might never have been discovered." Id. at 427 (citing FALSE CLAIMS REFORM ACT: HEARINGS ON
S.1562 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF TE SENATE
COMM. ON Tim JUDICIARY, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985), at 44 (testimony of Jay B. Stephens,
Deputy Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice)).
169. Kolis, supra note 18, at 429-30.
170. Id. at 435.
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since doing so would subvert the DOJ's role as a case manager
in the fight against fraud. In other words, instead of systemati-
cally bringing suits as part of a larger fight against fraud, the
DOJ would have to attend to and examine the multitude of
unrelated cases brought by numerous and varied private indi-
viduals. In effect, the DOJ felt that it would be "forced to
prosecute fraud in the ad hoc manner mandated by numerous
qui tam relators."'' Ten years after the passing of the 1986
Amendments the DOJ's fears appear to come true. In May of
1996, Lewis Morris, a deputy associate general counsel in the
Office of the Inspector General of the Health and Human Ser-
vices Department stated that the quality of the allegations that
qui tam relators have brought forth is "all over the place."'72
He further stated that the volume of qui tam cases "is signifi-
cantly distorting the investigative priorities" of the OIG and
"distorts [the OIG's] attempt to have a systematic approach to
dealing with fraud and abuse."'73
Finally, the DOJ also believed that if relators were al-
lowed to continue as co-parties in the government's suit against
a defendant, "some relators might file qui tam suits and insist
on remaining in the case only to engage in collusive litigation.
A DOJ co-party, truly aligned with the defendant, could stay in
the case and tip-off the defendant, deliberately interfere with
the proceedings, or negatively influence the outcome of the
suit."'7 While this scenario does not appear to have arisen so
far, the possibility is not precluded by the statute.
171. Id. at 430 n.97.
172. Government Officials Grouse About Burden of Investigating Complaints, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY 7, May 13, 1996 (commenting on how the proliferation of qui tam claims
consumes the OIG's investigative resources, and as a result, prevents the OIG from focusing on
other areas).
173. Id. Mr. Morris also indicated that the OIG wants an increased focus on managed care,
but cannot pursue it because the OIG is "busy chasing down qui tam claims." Id.
174. Kolis, supra note 18, at 429-30 (citing FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS: HEARINGS
BEFORE THE StUCOMM. ON ADMmSTRATiVE LAW AND GOVERNMEmAL RELATIONS ON THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (testimony of Richard K.
Willard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice)).
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7. Allowing Qui Tam Will Not Create More Judicial
Precedent Clarifying the Fraud and Abuse Laws
Allowing qui tam suits as a means of developing prece-
dent clarifying the scope of conduct prohibited under the Fraud
and Abuse statute is not worthwhile for several reasons. As
discussed previously, negative publicity, the large potential
penalties involved, and availability of reimbursement of attor-
neys fees all encourage the settlement of claims. Few cases are
litigated to completion, thus creating little judicial precedent.
Moreover, even if these cases routinely went through to
trial, without any legislative guidance, precedent could develop
in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner. This could just create
more confusion. In short, there is no guarantee that the devel-
opment of precedent will clarify the scope of conduct prohibit-
ed by the Fraud and Abuse statute.
V. CONCLUSION
When considered individually, the impact of the FCA's
qui tam provisions and the impact of the anti-kickback provi-
sion on health care providers and on the fight against health
care fraud is debatable. But, when a claim submitted to Medi-
care is considered false for purposes of the FCA by the mere
fact that it was submitted while the provider was allegedly in
violation of the anti-kickback law, the combination of these
statutes tilts the legal playing field to the disadvantage of
health care providers.
The FCA's generous, bounty-oriented award structure
strongly encourages plaintiff/realtors to bring suit. When com-
bined with the broad and vague scope of prohibited conduct
that providers face under the fraud and abuse laws, providers
are left facing potentially unlimited liability. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the costs of defending against such litigation,
providers face additional costs in developing and implementing
more secure internal compliance programs. Moreover, the
effectiveness of these efforts can be undermined by the sheer
lucrativeness of a qui tam suit itself to the individual plain-
tiff/realtor. In addition, ad hoc private enforcement of the anti-
kickback statute under qui tam can undermine the
government's own coordinated fraud-fighting efforts.
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In the absence of ambitious legislative overhaul, courts are
left to help providers navigate the broad scope of prohibited
conduct under the fraud and abuse statute. While the facts of
each case should guide any decision, considerations from equi-
ty and public policy indicate that courts should begin their own
analyses from a position that a qui tam claim cannot rest solely
on an alleged anti-kickback violation. Nonetheless, the weak-
ness of adhering to this position as a blanket rule is illustrated
by analysis of the Pogue and Thompson decisions. As such, as
the guiding lights in this area of law, courts should carefully
tailor their decisions to specific evidentiary factors and give as
specific direction as possible.

